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Ed Potosnak, 2nd from left. Four more years of sycophancy

A friend just forwarded Ed Potosnak NJ LCV’s fundraising letter to members, which outlined a “bold” agenda for the next 4 years.

One would think, after 4 years of a lot of promises but very little delivery from Gov. Murphy – and with NJ media finally honestly reporting that  fact – that NJ LCV would feel somewhat betrayed and reflect on the effectiveness of the sycophantic strategy of the first four years. (e.g. see: Green Masks Are Off)

One would think – after Gov. Murphy virtually ignored the climate crisis in his recent state of the state address – again, a fact critically reported by NJ media – that NJ LCV would join with real climate activists and express their deep disappointment and ramp up activist tactics and political pressure on Gov. Murphy.

One would think, with critically important upcoming DEP regulatory proposals on environmental justice, and climate, and electrification of buildings – and huge pending DEP permit decisions on multiple fossil infrastructure and environmental justice projects like PVSC power plant and Fortress Energy LNG (a project that is so bad, it has gotten national attention in the Washington Post)– that NJ LCV would join activists in drawing bright red lines and very clear demands on these issues, while ramping up pressure on Gov. Murphy.

One would think that NJ LCV would inform their members about and prioritize the enormous challenges ahead and important DEP policy and planning documents about to be released or finalized, including:

• DEP proposed Natural Lands Initiative which will determine the fate of NJ’s last remaining forests;

• DEP’s renegotiation of the greenhouse gas emissions caps under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) – (see RGGI Program Review) which, despite the fact that the current RGGI cap is 30% higher than current emissions (see bottom of page 5), is still more restrictive and will reduce more emissions than DEP’s lame proposed CO2 emission rule for the power sector. There are NO NJ activists involved in the current RGGI renegotiation!;

• DEP’s failure to respond to the explosion of a new wave of sprawl, including proliferation of warehouses and industrial solar arrays that are destroying the last remaining forests, farms and rural communities in NJ, triggering what I have called the need to fight the battle for “The Final Frontier” in NJ’s land use war;

• the need to derail the Gov.’s radically pro-development economic development plan for the Highlands;

• the need to restore focus and integrity at the Pinelands Commission. The conservation agenda for the Pinelands needs to focus on adopting CMP amendments to address the climate emergency, and restrict water use to protect ecological functions, and restrict destruction by ORV’s, and monitor and regulate endocrine disrupting chemicals.

• a host of science and regulatory issues to protect public health and ecological integrity by restoring Christie DEP rollbacks, closing critical climate loopholes, and strengthening current DEP clean water, clean air, land use, and drinking water regulations, including unregulated pharmaceuticals and endocrine disrupting chemicals;.and

• under-regulated chemical storage facilities that pose enormous unacceptable risk of fire and explosion to NJ urban communities.

And finally, one would think that after 4 years of spin by the Gov.’s Press Office and watching how DEP’s former corporate lawyer Commissioner has gaslighted communities across the state, one would think that the NJ LCV policy and program demands would be expressed clearly and with competence and precision, to leave very little wiggle room, i.e. don’t get fooled again.

One would be wrong – very wrong.

NJ LCV just issued what they delusionally described as a “bold” agenda for the next for years. (the only thing “bold” about it is the font I used!) Aside from the slogans, this agenda could have come from the NJ League of Municipalities.

Instead, it is lame (my comments in red). Read it (and then don’t weep: send your NJ LCV resignation email directly to Ed Potosnak):

• Make New Jersey’s commitment to a 100% clean energy economy permanent by ending diversions from the Clean Energy Fund

[note the failure to specify how the diversions would be stopped, e.g. a Constitutional amendment dedicating the Fund is the only way to do this.]

• Ensure communities have accessible and modern public transit by establishing a dedicated funding source for NJ Transit

[NJ Transit gets a dedicated funding source, but Clean energy, climate, clean water, state parks, etc don’t and suffer even more budget cuts like those that resulted from NJ LCV’s “Keep It Green” theft of environmental and state parks funds? NJ Transit still relies on fossil power.]

• Ensure our cities and towns are ready for extreme storms by giving municipalities resources to invest and install green infrastructure projects

[why is climate adaptation a local responsibility? Why does NJ LCV ignore DEP’s upcoming climate PACT land use regulations? Is Potosnak aware that the PVSC power plant is a local “resilience” project? That DEP’s “green infrastructure” stormwater regulations rolled back standards and was sharply criticized by FEMA?]

• Protect and expand access to open spaces by increasing funding for trail and park maintenance

[This is the worst one. NJ LCV was part of the “Keep It Green” campaign that stole funds constitutionally dedicated to State Parks. It takes real chutzpa to now call for more funding years after.]

• Reduce carbon pollution from homes and businesses by ending new residential natural gas interconnections, particularly in communities of color, and retrofitting existing homes

[Why not be clear? Why ignore flaws in BPU Energy Master Plan that defer consideration and implementation of building electrification to beyond 2030? Why not be specific on State regulations, e.g. DCA Building codes or DEP land use? Why not set specific carbon reduction goals and timetables? This is a worthy goal but the demand is lame and ineffective.]

From Bhopal To Beirut To Paulsboro: Passaic Chemical Fire Shows It Can Happen Here

Legislature Urged To Conduct Oversight And Enact Reforms 

More than 217 people were killed and 7,000 injured when 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate exploded in Beirut’s port on 4 August 2020. The blast displaced 300,000 people and caused widespread destruction and devastation, damaging buildings up to 20km away.  ~~~ Lebanon: One year on from devastating Beirut explosion, authorities shamelessly obstruct justice

The following is literally insane:

In places in NJ, it is illegal to smoke a cigarette within 100 feet of a school or playground.

• But you can store millions of pounds of “extraordinarily hazardous”, toxic, flammable and/or explosive chemicals literally next door to a school with minimal restrictions.

DEP regulations prohibit idling your car for more than 3 minutes to “protect the lungs of our children”.

• But you can operate a chemical plant or petroleum refinery that emits millions of pounds of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals into the air literally next door to a school with minimal restrictions.

You can’t get State and local permits to open a bicycle shop, bookstore, art gallery, Internet cafe, food co-op or affordable housing in an old industrial building without making massive investments in fire and other common sense safety measures, like sprinklers, smoke alarms, CO detectors, and fire prevention and suppression systems.

• But you can store millions of pounds of hugely flammable and explosive chemicals in old industrial buildings – firetraps with wooden floors and roofs – with minimal restrictions.

When Beirut blew up a little over a year ago, killing more than 217 people, Americans ignored or dismissed that catastrophe as the consequence of *backwards and corrupt Middle Eastern governments: what government would ever allow millions of pounds of highly explosive material to be stored in a densely populated city?

“The Beirut blast, one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history, inflicted widespread devastation and caused immense suffering. Lebanese authorities promised a swift investigation; instead they have brazenly blocked and stalled justice at every turn, despite a tireless campaign for justice and criminal accountability by survivors and families of victims,” said Lynn Maalouf, Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

“The Lebanese government tragically failed to protect the lives of its people, just as it has failed for so long to protect basic socio-economic rights. In blocking the judge’s attempts to summon political officials, the authorities have struck yet another blow to the people of Lebanon. Given the scale of this tragedy, it is astounding to see how far the Lebanese authorities are prepared to go to shield themselves from scrutiny.”

[* The late scholar Edward Said dismisses such ignorant arrogance:

But even larger deadly catastrophes can happen right here in NJ, see:

• 25 Years After Bhopal Chemical Disaster: NJ’s “Fatal Fifteen” Shows it Can Happen Here

And we almost just saw one in the Passaic, NJ chemical fire.

And just like Beirut officials resisted and covered up investigation and accountability, so too does that happen right here in NJ.

The resistance and corruption of State and local officials is compounded in NJ by the power of corporate interests, like the NJ Chemistry Council, the NJ Petroleum Council, and Big Pharma who repeatedly have blocked reforms (e.g. see below discussion of how they killed the bill to eliminate the $50 million liability cap. Those same corporate interests have blocked laws and DEP regulations to mandate reduction of greenhouse gas emissions).

For example, very few people are aware that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an investigation into the toxic train derailment that forced evacuation of Paulsboro NJ. For a link to the NTSB Report and excerpts of many critical findings, see:

• NTSB Issues Scathing Final Report on Paulsboro Toxic Train Derailment

The NTSB made several highly critical findings about the performance of State and local agencies, yet that NTSB Report was virtually ignored by NJ media, Legislative policymakers, and regulatory agencies like NJ DEP. NTSB found:

About 7:30 a.m., police radio transmissions suggested that the vapor cloud was “nontoxic.”  The police then changed the evacuation orders from mandatory evacuation to shelter-in-place. The police department did not become aware that vinyl chloride had been released until 8:30 a.m., just before the first incident command briefing. The situation was further confused when, at 10:30 a.m., the NJDEP publically (sic) announced that the hazard had dissipated. Therefore, the community protective measures were based on incorrect information about the released material.

…  The NTSB concludes that the dissemination of inaccurate public information about the release of vinyl chloride revealed the lack of an effective system for communicating to the public accurate information about the current situation following the accident.  (@ page 41)

These statistics indicate that many communities in the state still do not have NJSP-OEM-approved EOPs and that these communities are likely unprepared for emergencies that could occur in their jurisdictions, as was the Paulsboro community. This problem is  amplified by New Jersey home rule laws that keep authority for managing an incident at the lowest local government level, thus discouraging regional and state authorities from intervening in an incident, even when faced with obvious response deficiencies.

… The NTSB concludes that had the borough of Paulsboro [or NJ OEM] performed an assessment of the emergency response needs and capabilities for the hazardous materials that are present and transiting through its community, it would have been apparent that the emergency response capabilities and plans were inadequate for the types of high consequence incidents that can occur in the jurisdiction. (@ p.51-52)

Fact-based decisions regarding the community exposure did not occur until the unified command was established at 1:00 p.m., when the federal on-scene coordinator directed more information to be gathered about community exposures. (@ p.42)

Like many small fire departments throughout the country, the Paulsboro Fire Department was unprepared for large-scale hazardous material emergency responses. The frequency of hazardous materials train traffic through the borough would have suggested a higher level of awareness and preparedness. The firefighters need to understand how to respond to incidents involving such hazards and advise the community on whether to evacuate or shelter in place if a release does occur. (@p.47)

The NTSB concludes that the New Jersey firefighter certification and training requirements were not effective as demonstrated by the failure of emergency responders to conduct operations in accordance with established health and safety protocols and OSHA HAZWOPER standards, and their lack of familiarity with available tools to evaluate toxic exposure threats.  (@p.46)

That must not be allowed to happen again.

To try to stimulate the oversight, accountability and legislative and regulatory reforms to improve chemical safety in NJ, I fired off the letter below to Senate Environment Committee Chairman Bob Smith.

At the outset, I reminded Smith that he Chaired an Assembly Committee that held oversight hearings on the 1995 Knapp Technologies explosion in Lodi, NJ that killed 4 workers (full disclosure: I testified at that hearing and focused on the Whitman RTK and later broke the story on the TCPA rollbacks):

Dear Chairman Smith:

I am writing to urge that you direct an independent investigation, conduct open public legislative oversight hearings, and sponsor much needed legislative reforms to strengthen chemical safety and emergency response management planning and regulation, as recently exposed by the chemical fire in Passaic NJ.

As you will recall, as Chairman of an Assembly Committee, you held oversight hearings in the wake of the 1995 Knapp Technologies explosion in Lodi, NJ that killed 4 workers and put the community and emergency responders at risk.

Since then there have been a number of related incidents that strongly suggest the need for strengthening NJ’s chemical safety programs, including the toxic train derailment that forced evacuation of the community in Paulsboro, NJ.

As you know, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an investigation into the Paulsboro incident and issued a Report that found significant deficiencies in NJ’s State and local programs.

Unfortunately, the NTSB Report was largely ignored and necessary reforms were not adopted.

In light of those NTSB findings and the recent chemical fire in Passaic, I suggest you focus attention on the following issues: (not an exhaustive list)

I)  Unacceptable Risk Standard and Siting Restrictions, Phase Outs, And Bans

Under the federal Clean Air Act Section 112 Risk Management Planning (RMP) and NJ’s State Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), certain facilities are required to conduct worst case “off site consequence” analysis, including mapping of “kill zones” where nearby people might be killed by a catastrophic release or accident.

Facilities that use and store similarly hazardous chemicals and pose similar risks are not subject to these TCPA  requirements under the NJ Worker and Community Right to Know Act (RTK).

Legislative reforms should: 1) expand TCPA to RTK facilities above a certain risk threshold and mandate those analyses more broadly, 2) require that the results of these analyses be disclosed publicly, and 3) set siting standards as to what would constitute an “unacceptable risk” and unacceptable locations that would force shut down of operations. 

II)  Stronger State Standards and Oversight – Rescind Local Delegations

Please see the NTSB Report findings for deficiencies and suggested reforms.

“This problem is  amplified by New Jersey home rule laws that keep authority for managing an incident at the lowest local government level, thus discouraging regional and state authorities from intervening in an incident, even when faced with obvious response deficiencies.”

III)  Expansion of TCPA Protections Into RTK Program

(see above)

IV)  Public Disclosure Of “Kill Zone” Risk Maps

(see above)

V)  Immediate Incident Response Command Center And Real Time Disclosure Of All Monitoring Data

DEP should be required to immediately – or no later than 30 minutes after discovery – establish an incident command on scene.

DEP also should be required to create a website and disclose all monitoring data, in real time.

VI)  Eliminate The Spill Act $50 Million Cap On Liability

In the wake of the Gulf of Mexico BP oil well blowout, I recall that you sponsored legislation to eliminate the current $50 million liability cap in NJ Spill Act. see:

• Exxon Sellout Shines Light On NJ’s $50 Million Cap on Spill Liability

• NJ’s Cap on Pollution Liability Exposes The Public and Taxpayers to Toxic Risks

• Gulf Blowout Prompts NJ lawmakers to Seek Increase In Polluter Liability To $1 Billion

I understand that that legislation was never adopted, see:

• Did Oil and Chemical Industry Lobbyists Quietly Kill The $1 Billion Liability Bill?

That liability cap is obviously inadequate, as the risks exposed in Paulsboro and Passaic illustrate.

VII)  Additional Training, Certification, And State Oversight

(see NTSB Report findings)

VIII)  Eliminate Current Law Protections Of Trade Secrets

Current law establishes trade secret protections and criminal penalties for disclosure of trade secrets.

The public has no idea about how broadly these laws apply and what information is being kept secret.

It is likely that these secrecy protections are being abused. They should be strictly narrowed or abolished.

***IX)  Close the Gaping Loopholes In The Environmental Justice Law

The EJ law does not apply to DEP reviews and regulations under the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), the Worker and Community Right to Know Act (RTK) and State remediation law regarding cleanup, redevelopment, and NRD compensation and/or restoration of contaminated sites.

These loopholes must be closed.

I am available to disuse this recommendations or provide additional supporting material.

Respectfully,

Will DEP & Chemical Industry Get A Pass On Huge Risks Revealed By Passaic Chemical Fire?

A Bhopal Toxic Catastrophe Can Happen Here

Kuehne Chemical, Kearny, NJ. Accident would kill over 100,000 people. Note chemical industry “Responsible Care” PR logo. Is it responsible to pose this kind of fatal threat to 12 million people living in an urban area?

These totally unacceptable risks are concentrated in NJ’s poor and minority communities, yet the highly touted NJ environmental justice law does not apply to chemical safety issues, e.g. the DEP Right To Know, Pollution Prevention, or Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Acts.

The people of Passaic NJ and surrounding towns just dodged a deadly bullet. Actually, it was far more than a bullet, it was a bomb.

How can millions of pounds of a deadly chemical be allowed to be stored in a densely populated city?

And it is not the first time –

I was around in 1995 when the Knapp Technologies explosion (hit link for the NY Times story) killed four workers, where an investigation revealed that the Whitman Administration’s rollback of DEP Right To Know (RTK) regulations put workers, emergency responders, and the public at risk.

Just prior to that disaster, the Whitman DEP rolled back chemical safety regulations despite warnings from DEP experts that there would be a “significant increase in the number of potential fatalities“.

Specifically, a July 29, 1994 memo from Assistant Commissioner Nagy to Commissioner Shinn compared DEP’s strict standards with weaker EPA requirements. It warned of a significant increase in the number of potential fatalities if DEP rolled back NJ standards to federal EPA minimums. This was not some tree hugger warning, it came from Shinn’s own Assistant Commissioner (complete memo found on page 126 of Whitman Senate confirmation transcript):

“Industry (e.g., CIC and NJBIA) would obviously prefer backing off to the EPA thresholds. ….However, the increases made by EPA on adoption were so large (averaging some 18 times the TCPA values with 33 of the 60 substances common to both lists assigned from 5 to 167 times corresponding TCPA values) that they are not technically justifiable in an area as densely populated as New Jersey where substances are generally handled on small sites, and would correlate with a significant increase in the number of potential fatalities.

Got that? The Whitman DEP policy would result in an “Increase in the number of potential fatalities”. That warning was issued 9 months BEFORE the Knapp Technologies disaster. In addition to ignoring those TCPA warnings, Whitman  slashed New Jersey’s Right to know list by about 2,000 chemicals and adopted the weaker federal EPA RTK reporting thresholds, based on Whitman’s Ex. Order #27 federal consistency policy.

DEP’s “Worker and Community Right To Know Act” regulations explicitly acknowledge (but under-regulate) fire and explosive risks:

While DEP regulations severely under-regulate the chemical industry and fail to adequately inform and protect the public, they do protect corporate interests and even establish criminal penalties for whistleblowing and/or leaking certain information:

But still, nothing essentially has changed at DEP for almost 30 years since the Knapp disaster. Gov. Murphy even retained the Whitman/Christie federal consistency rollback policy (see Murphy’s Ex. Order #63).

Twelve years ago, I again wrote this to warn of those risks:

• 25 Years After Bhopal Chemical Disaster: NJ’s “Fatal Fifteen” Shows it Can Happen Here

Although the public knows virtually nothing about it, this is not a problem of NJ’s industrial legacy. NJ still is saturated with deadly dangerous chemical manufacturing and storage facilities, typically located in densely populated areas: (NJTV News)

“Shelter in place is what I grew up in as ‘duck and cover.’ The idea that you could somehow shelter in place and be safe from these risks is ludicrous on its face,” Wolfe said. …

These facilities are part of a chemical industrial complex that stretches for about 20 miles along the banks of the Delaware River. Paulsboro is a community that’s pretty much in the middle of that. We were at Paulsboro High School, about a football field away from those facilities.

“The industry has created maps showing where there is called a ‘kill zone’ where in the event of an accident like this, had that been a chlorine tank, literally hundreds or thousands of people could have been killed, instantly,” Wolfe said.  ~~~NJTV News, 12/4/14

The chemical fire in Passaic involved chlorine.

Very recently, on December 9, 2021, I again wrote about the NJ Right To Know and other chemical safety regulatory programs. I highlighted the fact that because DEP no longer issued annual public reports, that the people of NJ were put at risk, see:

• Critical Environmental Information Buried In The Bowels Of the Bureaucracy – What You Don’t Know Can Kill You

The DEP has failed to prepare and publicly release annual Reports of the critically important data on manufacture, use, storage and discharge of toxic and extraordinarily hazardous chemicals collected under the NJ Worker and Community Right to Know Act, the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, and the Pollution Prevention Act. DEP had annually released public reports of that data for decades, prior to 2010….

These failures at DEP have gone unchallenged by any Legislative oversight or media coverage.

Environmental groups who used to work on these pollution and corporate accountability issues have abandoned the field for corporate foundation funded “greener” pastures.

The public has no way of knowing about any of this. […]

V) Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act

These are the “Bhopal” facilities, were an accident literally could kill thousands of people nearby.

In fact, DEP TCPA regulations require a chemical facility to prepare a map that show’s the “kill zone”.

They hide the “kill zone” behind the Orwellian bureaucratic euphemism “off site consequence analysis“.

Thousands dead is some “consequence”, eh?

Do you live in a “kill zone”? Does you child go to school in a “kill zone”?

Don’t ask DEP – and they won’t tell 

These totally unacceptable risks are concentrated in NJ’s poor and minority communities, yet the highly touted NJ environmental justice law does not apply to chemical safety issues, e.g. the DEP Right To Know, Pollution Prevention, or Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Acts.

As I warned on 11/16/20 (see: Questions For Senator Booker and EJ Advocates At NJ Spotlight’s Roundtable On NJ’s “Landmark” EJ Law

The NJ EJ law does not apply to greenhouse gas emissions & climate adaptation

It also does not apply to “extraordinarily hazardous substances” (i.e. to facilities subject to NJ’s Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act and federal Clean Air Act Sect. 112 Risk Management Planning requirements).

It also exempted contaminated sites & air pollution sources that emit less than 100 tons/per year (including industrial emissions of hazardous air pollutant (HAP)s, many of which are carcinogens and create unacceptable risks in far lesser quantities).

There needs to be much stricter DEP regulatory oversight and stricter standards (like fire prevention and suppression in old industrial buildings that are fire hazards) for these kinds of unacceptable chemical risks, including banning some locations where storage of highly toxic chemicals is nearby dense residential neighborhoods.

I sent to this note to Bergen Record reporter Yellin, who did a local fire department focused story about how Passaic dodged a bullet, asking for followup to investigate the broader issues and the need to reduce these unacceptable risks:

Greetings – just read your story.

Perhaps you might want to do followup on the DEP angle, as the stored chemicals were subject to DEP Right To Know (RTK) program requirements and DEP Emergency Management was on scene. Both program have not been subject to media or public scrutiny in a long time and the last time it was (Paulsboro toxic train derailment), the National transportation Safety Board issued a scathingly critical report on their performance. You might be surprised by the qualifications (NONE) of the DEP Chief of Staff who oversee the DEP Emergency Response program. And the fact that DEP no longer releases annual RTK Reports and data on chemical use etc.

Were their RTK plans up to date? When was last DEP inspection? What is the compliance and enforcement history here? Were local emergency responders aware of RTK hazards and fire prevention and emergency response? Are sprinklers and otters fire prevention measures required by DEP RTK regulations?

Here is an excerpt on my initial take:

http://www.wolfenotes.com/2022/01/passaic-chemical-fire-raises-concerns-about-dep-emergency-response/

“First off, it looks like the chlorine Pool Trol Chlorine Stabilizer by Qualco, Inc. (Cyanuric acid CAS #108-80-5) is a chemical regulated by NJ DEP’s Right To Know program.

…5. Fire Fighting Measures Suitable Extinguishing Media: Use water spray, alcohol-resistant foam, dry chemical or carbon dioxide Special Hazards Arising from the substance or mixture: Carbon oxides, Nitrogen … additional processing occurs. Provide appropriate exhaust ventilation at places where dust is formed. For precautions, see section 2.2. Storage: Keep container tightly closed in a dry, well ventilated place.

Second, the DEP Emergency Response program was severely criticized by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in how it responded to the toxic train derailment in Paulsboro, NJ, see:

• NTSB Issues Scathing Final Report on Paulsboro Toxic Train Derailment

A lot of the NTSB criticism involved various communications and management failures.

DEP Emergency Response Reports To Gov. Via A Weak Link In The Chain of Command

Was Chemical Plant Subject to DEP Right To Know & TCPA Regulations?

Another “duck and cover” and “duct tape” job?

The NY Times concludes its report today on the chemical fire in Passaic thusly: (my emphasis)

Mr. Lora said that he had spoken to Gov. Philip D. Murphy, who dispatched state environmental and emergency management officials to the scene.

Mr. Murphy said on Twitter on Friday that he was urging “everyone in Passaic to stay safe.”

“Praying for the safety of our first responders on the scene,” he wrote.

So, let’s dispatch with the Gov.’s prayers – on Twitter no less – while I make just a few important observations about DEP’s Emergency Response program that some enterprising journalist may want to investigate.

(Does Gov. Murphy even know that stuff like this actually happens in NJ?:

• NJ School Used Duct Tape To Respond To Toxic Oil Spill

First off, it looks like the chlorine Pool Trol Chlorine Stabilizer by Qualco, Inc. (Cyanuric acid CAS #108-80-5) is a chemical regulated by NJ DEP’s Right To Know program.

Were their RTK plans up to date? When was last DEP inspection? What is the compliance and enforcement history here? Were local emergency responders aware of RTK hazards and fire prevention and emergency response?

Second, the DEP Emergency Response program was severely criticized by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in how it responded to the toxic train derailment in Paulsboro, NJ, see:

• NTSB Issues Scathing Final Report on Paulsboro Toxic Train Derailment

A lot of the NTSB criticism involved various communications and management failures.

About 7:30 a.m., police radio transmissions suggested that the vapor cloud was “nontoxic.”  The police then changed the evacuation orders from mandatory evacuation to shelter-in-place. The police department did not become aware that vinyl chloride had been released until 8:30 a.m., just before the first incident command briefing. The situation was further confused when, at 10:30 a.m., the NJDEP publically (sic) announced that the hazard had dissipated. Therefore, the community protective measures were based on incorrect information about the released material.

…  The NTSB concludes that the dissemination of inaccurate public information about the release of vinyl chloride revealed the lack of an effective system for communicating to the public accurate information about the current situation following the accident.  (@ page 41)

These statistics indicate that many communities in the state still do not have NJSP-OEM-approved EOPs and that these communities are likely unprepared for emergencies that could occur in their jurisdictions, as was the Paulsboro community. This problem is  amplified by New Jersey home rule laws that keep authority for managing an incident at the lowest local government level, thus discouraging regional and state authorities from intervening in an incident, even when faced with obvious response deficiencies.

… The NTSB concludes that had the borough of Paulsboro [or NJ OEM] performed an assessment of the emergency response needs and capabilities for the hazardous materials that are present and transiting through its community, it would have been apparent that the emergency response capabilities and plans were inadequate for the types of high consequence incidents that can occur in the jurisdiction. (@ p.51-52)

Fact-based decisions regarding the community exposure did not occur until the unified command was established at 1:00 p.m., when the federal on-scene coordinator directed more information to be gathered about community exposures. (@ p.42)

Like many small fire departments throughout the country, the Paulsboro Fire Department was unprepared for large-scale hazardous material emergency responses. The frequency of hazardous materials train traffic through the borough would have suggested a higher level of awareness and preparedness. The firefighters need to understand how to respond to incidents involving such hazards and advise the community on whether to evacuate or shelter in place if a release does occur. (@p.47)

The NTSB concludes that the New Jersey firefighter certification and training requirements were not effective as demonstrated by the failure of emergency responders to conduct operations in accordance with established health and safety protocols and OSHA HAZWOPER standards, and their lack of familiarity with available tools to evaluate toxic exposure threats.  (@p.46)

Were those same flaws repeated in this Passaic fire? Who will ask DEP about all that?

Third, I Hear An Echo: Does anyone recall the real reason for Gov. McGreevey’s downfall?

It was not because he was gay.

It was because he installed his lover in a critically important emergency management post:(Wiki)

During his gubernatorial tenure, McGreevey—who was then married to Dina Matos —appointed Golan Cipel, his secret lover, as homeland security advisor despite Cipel’s lack of relevant experience or qualifications.

Now let’s explain that echo to the McGreevey administration.

The current Murphy DEP Emergency Response Program is headed by longtime veteran DEP manger Bon Van Fossen (see DEP Org chart). Despite scathing NTSB criticism, he is eminently qualified for that job.

So far, so good.

But notice from the DEP organizational chart that veteran DEP Emergency Response manager Bob Van Fossen reports to DEP Commissioner LaTourette (who reports to Gov. Murphy) through the DEP Chief of Staff, a very young and inexperience woman named Jane Rosenblatt.

She has no business being in that position and is totally unqualified for it.

She has ZERO education or experience in Emergency Management or Emergency Response or even DEP. NONE. NADA

How can Rosenblatt possibly be the Chief of Staff at DEP – reporting directly to the Commissioner and overseeing the DEP Emergency Response Program – when she has ZERO DEP experience and ZERO management experience? What kind of Commissioner would hire someone like that?

If that name sounds familiar, perhaps that’s because her father, Dave Rosenblatt, is a long time DEP manager and Chief Resilience Officer and Assistant Commission at the Murphy DEP. Slightly off the emergency response topic (but germane to the Commissioner’s judgement), but this Rosenblatt has his own issues:

Surely [LaTourette] must know that [his] chosen “Chief Resilience Officer” Dave Rosenblatt was DEP’s point person in dealing with former Gov. Christie’s “Sandy Redevelopment Czar” Marc Ferdan.

Thus, Gov. Murphy is dependent upon someone with absolutely no experience or expertise in how he gets his information from DEP regarding critical emergency response activities.

Thus, DEP Commissioner LaTourette – who reports directly to Gov. Murphy – is reliant on a Chief of Staff with no expertise or experience in communicating and managing complex scientific and regulatory issues involved in emergency management.

Thus, the community at risk of evacuation and the media are dependent on this same weak link in the DEP chain of command.

Just let that sink in.

Then call your legislator and demand legislative oversight at DEP.